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A paper to be included in a volume devoted to the comparison to the
comparative history of blockages, edited by Professor Jean-David Avenal.
INTRODUCTION
Blockade, as a formal and systematic weapon in modern naval warfare,
distinct from battle and maneuver, developed during the Napoleonic wars and
was further refined by the Royal Navy in its decades-long campaign after 1815
to suppress the African slave trade (1). In spite of this extensive history, it was
not until the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War that a Declaration
Respecting Maritime Law, dated April 16, 1856, formally established the general
principles of international law that would define blockade and abolish
privateering, blockade's traditional response. Blockades were described in four
short articles:
1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband
goods;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband war, are not liable to
capture under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say,
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the
enemy (2).
The Declaration of 1856 envisioned naval activity in terms of three simple
categories, men-of-war, merchant vessels, and the now illegal privateers, or
commerce raiders. There categories had been formed by centuries of experience
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with sailing ships made of wood, armed with cannon effective in terms of yards.
The blockade itself was sailing squadrons patrolling seaports. Contraband of war
was thought of as guns and ammunition, while other stock in trade was regarded
as ordinary commerce and exempt from seizure. Neutrals were recognized
governments that had not declared war. The Declaration made everything
perfectly clear in law and fact.
Steam power and metallurgical technology were altering all this, but the
Declaration declared principles on the basis of continuity, of what was known,
rather than change, or what was merely imagined. The diplomats and admirals in
Paris also assumed that Britannia would continue to rule the waves and that
naval war in Europe was unlikely, making the principles of the Declaration
applicable into the indefinite future. But the principles of 1856 were soon to be
tested on all the world's oceans by an unexpected conflict, the American Civil
War, an were to be upheld by diplomacy and international law in the Geneva
Tribunal of Arbitration (1872) after they had been found simplistic and obsolete
by the experience of war.
Origins of the Civil War Blockade
Although the United States of America was not a signatory to the
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, negotiations in the spring of 1861
between Washington and London (and Paris) concerning the maritime
implications of secession and Civil War proceeded upon the principles contained
therein. The initial issues, from March to May, 1861, involved the British
recognition of rebellion and belligerency in the Confederacy, along with the
refusal of the British and the French to give formal diplomatic recognition of the
Confederacy. The question of recognition led immediately to discussion of
issues of blockade and privateering. Have no navy, the Confederate President,
Jefferson Davis, turned to commerce raiding as a way of confronting the Union
at sea. In April, 1861, Davis issued letters of marquee and reprisal, placing his
regime in direct opposition to the Declaration of 1856. President Lincoln
proclaimed the southern privateers to be pirates, which, in the absence of formal
diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy by major foreign governments, was
not entirely inaccurate description of their status. On April 20, 1861, a week after
the Confederate shelling of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln extended war at sea
by announcing a blockade on Southern ports (4). This placed the American
government within the spirit of the Declaration, though questions remained as to
whether the Union blockade in the summer and fall of 1861 fell within the
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definition of a real impediment to trade (5), or was merely a paper blockade.
Nevertheless, the Union intent was clear. The United States would adhere to the
Declaration of 1856 and would demand that other powers did as well.
Nature of the Blockade
Once established during the summer of 1861, the Union blockade of the
Confederacy became an instrument of geo-strategy that was far more
sophisticated than the mere presence of naval squadrons envisioned by the
signatories to the Declaration. The American blockade, over the course of 1861
to 1862, came to consist of four distinct levels of interdiction of Southern
commerce and naval warfare. The first level was a systematic effort beginning in
1862, to conquer the Confederate littoral, including rivers and seaports. Troops
landed on the Carolina coast and occupied ports and towns, and a naval squadron
ascended the Mississippi River, capturing New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and
Natchez, thus closing the main pre-war artery of Southern Commerce (6). The
second level involved naval squadrons blockading the coastal sea lanes in the
traditional manner. Few and scattered in 1861, these squadrons commanded the
still unconquered stretches of Southern coast by 1863 (7). The few southern
ports that remained open in the autumn of 1863, primarily Mobile, Alabama,
Charleston, South Carolina, and Wilmington, North Carolina, were sufficiently
patrolled that only the swiftest and most daring runners made it through the
Union squadrons. Even when successful, blockade running could not supply the
import needs of a regional economy, nor get enough cotton abroad to support the
Confederacy at home. The first two levels of the Union blockade had cut the
Confederacy off from the world in less than 20 months.
The third level and fourth levels of the Union blockade operated on a world
stage as opposed to being concentrated on and close to the southern shore. The
third level consisted of warships roaming the oceans searching for Confederate
commerce raiders, such as the Alabama. This element of the blockade was
designed to eliminate offensive Confederate naval warfare, which had the effect
of driving marine insurance rates in increased war premiums to levels that
threatened to choke off Union commerce (8). Finally, a fourth level of blockade,
consisting of diplomatic and intelligence services, was established in Great
Britain and France to prevent Confederate ship-building abroad (9). Although
the weight of the Union effort in these two levels of blockade resided in
intelligence and diplomacy rather than invasion, and in cruisers rather than
fleets, the result was the same. By the beginning of 1864, Confederate efforts to
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gain naval foothold in Europe or drive Union commerce from the high seas, were
clearly failing, the result of Union victories in America and the cautions
calculation of European governments.
This multi-level blockade was something new in naval warfare, but by 1864,
it had succeeded in destroying Confederate capacity to engage in foreign
commerce or wage naval warfare (10). It also demonstrated how complex a
geo-strategic weapon, combining military, diplomatic, commercial and
intelligence components, an effective naval blockade had become (and had to
become) in an industrial age. Blockades had transcended the ships at sea and
encompassed civilian concerns of commerce, industry and finance, as well as
wider military efforts of intelligence, diplomacy, and technology.
The Union Blockade: Land and Sea
Although the Carolina coastal campaigns closed several smaller Southern
ports, the most important strategic imitative undertaken by the Union involving
the first two levels of blockade was the Mississippi River campaign in 1862
which closed the major artery of southern commerce. New Orleans was the
leading southern port in 1860, as the steamboat technology funneled the produce
of the entire mid-continent down the river to the Crescent City (11). Since there
were numerous bayous and mouths of the river that connected the Mississippi to
the sea, the requirement of the blockade meant that the Union must capture New
Orleans and control both the river and the coast. To that end, the Union launched
a combined arms campaign, involving a fleet moving up the Mississippi to run
the down-river forts of Jackson and St. Phillip and an army to occupy New
Orleans and its environs after the fleet had closed the river to Confederate traffic.
The river fortresses, Jackson and St. Phillip, had been designed in the
generation before the Civil War, when land-based cannons outgunned shipboard
ordnance, and steam engines were barely able to propel men of war upriver
against the stiff Mississippi current. At the time, in the 1830s, the forts had
seemed adequate to the task of protecting New Orleans, but by 1862, naval
technology, both in cannon and engines, had shifted the advantage from forts to
ships. The forts were the only defense New Orleans possessed. Built up to its
levies, which were lined with docks and warehouse, the city was entirely
vulnerable to cannon fire. If the blockading fleet ran the forts, surrender and
occupation were the only option available to New Orleans.
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So important was New Orleans to the commercial life of the Confederacy
that its capture on April 25, 1862, decisively altered the first two levels of the
blockade to the Union advantage. Occupation of New Orleans added the river
fleets to the Ocean blockade, transforming the blockade from a largely passive
commercial interdiction into part of the military effort to occupy the
Confederacy and end the war. The war at sea became joined, on the rivers, with
the war on land. Moreover, the capture of New Orleans opened the lower
Mississippi valley to Union commerce. The plantations along the Mississippi
had no choice but to continue to ship their cash crops, primarily cotton and
sugar, to New Orleans, where that helped sustain the Union economy rather than
sustaining the Confederacy (12). With the conquest of New Orleans,
geo-economics joined geo-strategy simultaneously producing a decisive Union
victory through redirecting the commerce of the Mississippi to the benefit of the
Union.
The capture of New Orleans instantly added a strategic dimension to another
combined arms campaign that had already moved south against the Confederate
river fortifications in north-western Tennessee. General U.S. Grant and Admiral
Andrew Foote took Fort Henry on the lower Tennessee River on February 6,
1862, and Grant captured Fort Donaldson on the Cumberland about a week later.
These victories opened the upper Mississippi to a Union advance, and it became
possible to envision Union control over the entire Mississippi valley. Grant
continued to move south, and captured Vicksburg, Mississippi, on July 4, 1863.
Two widely separated and early successes at either end of the river, one victory
associated primarily with blockade and the other with invasion of the South,
came together in an 18 month campaign that cut the South in half and made a
Confederate victory impossible. In the American Civil War, blockade moved in
a single year from interdiction of commerce to an active instrument of conquest.
The third and fourth levels of the Union blockade, clearing the seas of
commerce raiders and preventing Confederate shipbuilding abroad, were
geopolitical responses to an imaginative Confederate effort to leap over the
physical blockade of their coasts. Lacking the industrial infrastructure to build a
navy at home, the Confederacy sought to build warships in England and France,
thus attacking the Union commercial shipping on the high seas and creating a
blockade of its own. The Confederate assault was primarily upon the costs of
commerce, particularly driving up marine insurance rates, but these tactics were
not ineffective just because they were novel. The Declaration of 1856 and Union
naval strategy envisioned a physical blockade, while the Confederacy sought to
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counter this with a financial (and fiscal) blockade, hoping to increase the costs of
trade sufficiently to drive American flag shipping into port (13). Both sought the
destruction of commerce; only the means differed (14).
The key Union efforts to establish the third and fourth levels of the maritime
blockade began in 1862, and were greatly expanded after their failure to prevent
the C.S.S. Alabama from getting to sea. The Union legal and intelligence efforts
in Europe were only beginning in May and June of 1862, and Confederate
Captain James Bullock was able to slip the Alabama to sea on July 29 (15). But
the Union response to this contretemps was sufficiently vigorous and sustained
to limit Confederate commerce raiders built in Europe from playing a critical
role on the strategic level of the war (16). It included intense diplomatic pressure
on the British and French governments, an extensive intelligence effort to detect
shipbuilding on the ground, and outfitting cruisers to chase down the southern
commerce raiders. On the third and fourth levels of the Union blockade, military
and civilian activity merged into a single campaign in which memos and
meetings had become as important as sailing and shooting.
As with the blockading squadrons and coastal conquest, the Union
diplomatic and cruiser blockade prevailed on the strategic level. Commerce
raiding was the maritime equivalent of guerilla war on land. The Confederate
raiders had some striking success, but commerce raiding exhibited all the
problems inherent in irregular conflict. The raiders could not maintain consistent
pressure on Union commerce, so the advantages gained proved evanescent while
the Union blockade on all four levels became gradually more effective. The
raiders were hunted down and destroyed, marine insurance stabilized, Union
commerce regained lost ground, and European governments steadily refused to
recognize the Confederacy. The Union blockade achieved its geo-strategic goal
of cutting the Confederacy off from the world, and had done so by changing the
nature and definition of a naval blockade from cutting a city or state off from the
world to cutting the world off from a city or state.
Consequences of the Blockade: Diplomacy and Law
Blockades normally end when the war does, but the differences between the
United States and Great Britain over the proper role of neutrals were too great to
disappear quietly after Appomattox. The shooting in American might stop but
the shouting across the Atlantic increased. The United States Senate resolved on
December 4 and 10, 1867 and again on May 27, 1868 to ask the State
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Department to put together the Alabama Claims against Great Britain, and that
was done by April 7, 1869. The Grant administration pursued these claims
diplomatically, and on May 8, 1871, concluded in Washington a treaty with
Great Britain to submit everything to a Tribunal of Arbitration to be convened at
Geneva.
The depredations of the insurgent cruisers, the Sumter, Nashville, Florida,
Alabama, Georgia, Shenandoah, Chickamauga, Tallahassee, and Retribution,
reached a huge sum for the times, over nineteen millions in nineteenth century
gold dollars, according to the Claims Against Great Britain submitted to the
Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration (17). Money reinforced moral outrage at assumed
British connivance at what Americans saw as piratical depredations upon
civilians as well as costs in treasure (precisely quantified) levied upon the United
States. The costs inflicted upon the United States and private merchants and
banks by the Confederate efforts to leap over the shoreline blockade by finding
support in Europe were too large to ignore and the irritation with the British was
too deep to forgive.
The position of the American government was clear. Convinced of British
sympathy for the Confederacy, which was not true, the American government
regarded the huge and unexpected losses as at least partially the fault of the
British. A Republican government, which was attuned to the interest of
commerce and industry, was determined to push claims for compensation. The
British position was more ambiguous. Though Britain defended its conduct and
attitudes, the British, who would certainly be the maritime power to impose a
naval blockade in the next conflict, also wanted the arbitration and diplomacy to
conclude results favorable to the blockading power, which had been the United
States. The British therefore were prepared to make concessions, including
allowing the dispute to come to binding arbitration, which would then turn mere
claims into an agreement the British would have to honor.
Arbitration moved the debate from politics to law and economics, and in
1872, the Tribunal issued its findings and began publishing its report. What
matters is not the local findings, somewhat more favorable to the United States
than might have been predicted, but the immense distance reality had wrought
upon the simple formulations of the Declaration of 1856. In Paris in 1856, a
naval blockade was seen as a simple and mechanical application of naval
squadron tactics. In Geneva in 1872, a naval blockade was a complex multi-level
geo-strategic activity, covering not just a coast but the whole world, involving
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not just ships but lawyers, insurance brokers and diplomats. Blockades had
become an entire theatre of war, evolving their own tactics and specialized
weapons, along with spurring innovative techniques for breaking the blockade
down. What new forms these weapons, tactics and techniques would take could
not be known in 1872, but it as clear that the experience of naval blockade
during the American Civil War had rendered obsolete, even quaint, all the
blockade experience that had gone before. The geo-strategic shadow of the Civil
War experience in naval blockade proved to be more durable than almost any
other aspect of conflict.
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